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The behaviour of norm-autonomous agents is determined by their goals and the norms
that are explicitly represented inside their minds. Thus, they require mechanisms for
acquiring and accepting norms, determining when norms are relevant to their case, and
making decisions about norm compliance. Up until now the existing proposals on norm-
autonomous agents assume that agents interact within a deterministic environment that is
certainly perceived. In practise, agents interact by means of sensors and actuators under
uncertainty with non-deterministic and dynamic environments. Therefore, the existing
proposals are unsuitable or, even, useless to be applied when agents have a physical
presence in some real-world environment. In response to this problem we have developed
the n-BDI architecture. In this paper, we propose a multi-context graded BDI architecture
(called n-BDI) that models norm-autonomous agents able to deal with uncertainty in
dynamic environments. The n-BDI architecture has been experimentally evaluated and the
results are shown in this paper.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The ﬁrst approaches on norms inside the multi-agent system (MAS) ﬁeld assumed that agents have a physical presence
in closed and relatively static environments where agents cooperate to achieve a common objective. For this reason, these
ﬁrst proposals were focused on hard-coding norms on agents. Later, the interest switched from such closed systems to
open and dynamic systems in which heterogeneous and autonomous agents coexist. Norm-programmed agents are unsuit-
able for these systems because of two main reasons [21]: the circumstances might change, which makes the programmed
norms obsolete; and agents may interact with agents that follow different norms. In this situation, explicit representations
of norms can support appropriate, more ﬂexible, reasoning. Thus, there was a shift from norm-programmed agents into
norm-autonomous agents.
In [16] a norm-autonomous agent is deﬁned as an agent whose behaviour is inﬂuenced by norms that are explicitly
represented inside its mind. Agents with an explicit representation of norms are able to participate in different societies
(in which different norms may apply), to communicate norms and to reason about them [33]. Norm-autonomous agents
require capabilities for acquiring norms; i.e., agents should be capable of recognising the norms that are in force in their
environment [4]. Moreover, agents can have motivations to accept these recognised norms [33]. For example, a norm can be
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need to be endowed with capabilities for determining whether a norm concerns their case and it is relevant [31]. Once the
recognised norm has been accepted and considered as relevant, then agents must decide whether or not to conform to it.
This decision about obeying or violating a norm is known as norm compliance decision [33].
Up until now, the majority of the existing proposals on norm-autonomous agents, such as [10] and [4], assume that
agents interact within a deterministic environment that certainly perceived. As a consequence, they propose rigid and static
procedures, such as utility functions, for reasoning about norms. Thus, these proposals assume that it is possible to deﬁne
off-line which the best decision in all circumstances is. It entails a limitation on the agent capacities for adapting to new
societies or to the environmental changes. The development of dynamic mechanisms for allowing agents to reason about
norms according to current circumstances has received little attention [33]. Moreover, these proposals assume that agents
are situated within an environment that can be perceived by agents with complete precision. In practise, agents interact by
means of sensors and actuators under uncertainty with a non-deterministic environment. Therefore, the existing solutions
are unsuitable to be applied in real applications. To address this problem, we propose here to endow norm-autonomous
agents with declarative and ﬂexible procedures for reasoning about norms under uncertainty within dynamic environments.
Speciﬁcally, in this paper we propose a new architecture for norm-autonomous agents. This architecture, named as
n-BDI, is an expansion of a multi-context graded BDI architecture [12] with explicit normative notions. Thus, our agents
have a more precise representation of the uncertainty and the norms that regulate this environment. Moreover, agents use
declarative procedures that adapt to different personality traits depending on the cognitive elements present in the agent
theory. Thereby, our agents are able to achieve a better adaptation to dynamic environments. To demonstrate this we will
use them a ﬁre-rescue case study. Speciﬁcally, we seek to determine whether the fact that our agents have an explicit
representation of the uncertainty and that they use expressive and ﬂexible rules to reason about norms allows them to
achieve a better adaptation to the environment.
This article is organised as follows: in the next section we introduce the ﬁre rescue case study and the basic notions
used in this paper. In Section 3 we propose the n-BDI architecture. Sections 4 and 5 describe the two main components of
the n-BDI architecture. Section 6 describes how n-BDI agents make decisions about norm compliance. Section 7 contains the
evaluation of the n-BDI architecture. We make a review of related work in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 contains conclusions
of this paper.
2. Background
2.1. Case study
As aforementioned, we will use in this paper a ﬁre-rescue case study to: (i) illustrate how an n-BDI agent reasons about
norms under uncertainty within a dynamic environment; and (ii) evaluate if our agents achieve better results in such kind
of situations. In the ﬁre-rescue case study we consider two different types of persons: a ﬁreman1 and victims that must be
rescued. Victims are located in a building in ﬂames. Since they are not endowed with ﬂame-proof clothes they wait until
they are rescued by a ﬁreman who leads victims to the door of the building. The ﬁreman dies when there is not any path
that allows him to reach the door. There are norms that deﬁne general patterns that ﬁremen must follow when dealing with
ﬁre threats. Speciﬁcally, we assume the existence of a norm that obliges ﬁremen to abort the ﬁre-rescue operation when it
is taking too much risk. This is a simple scenario controlled by a single norm that becomes relevant under circumstances
that are uncertain (i.e., a risky situation). Moreover, the ﬁreman cannot be sure of the repercussions of violating or obeying
the norm. Finally, the environment (i.e., the building design and the position of victims) may change from ﬁre-rescue to
ﬁre-rescue. Thus, decision making procedures that allow ﬁremen to make decisions in unforeseen ﬁre-rescue scenarios are
required.
2.2. Multi-context graded BDI architecture
A norm-autonomous agent is deﬁned in this paper as a practical reasoning agent [14] whose actions are directed towards
its internal goals and the norms that regulate its environment. Speciﬁcally, this paper focuses on how a norm-autonomous
agent reasons about norms under uncertainty within dynamic environments. To make such kind of decisions a norm-
autonomous agent considers its current circumstances; i.e., the beliefs about the world in which the agent is placed; and
its objectives or the situations that the agent wants to accomplish or bring about; i.e., the agent desires. For these reasons,
in this paper we endow BDI agents with capabilities for considering norms in their decisions. The feature that distinguishes
norm-autonomous BDI agents from classic BDI agents is the availability of an explicit representation of norms and instances
and the capabilities for reasoning about them. It serves this purpose well to address different mental attitudes in a modular
way, and for that reason we rely on multi-context systems for the formalisation of those attitudes [26,9].
The main intuition beyond multi-context systems is that reasoning is usually performed on a subset of the global knowl-
edge base. Each one of these subsets is a context. Informally, a context contains a partial theory of the world which encodes
1 For simplicity, we assume that only one ﬁreman participates in the ﬁre-rescue operation.
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interconnected contexts 〈{Ci}i∈I ,〉. Each context has inference routines used to reason about it [25]. Formally, each context
ci ∈ {Ci}i∈I is a tuple 〈Li, Ai,i〉, where Li , Ai and i are the language, axioms and inference rules deﬁning the logic of each
context, respectively. Moreover, the reasoning in one context may affect reasoning in other contexts. Speciﬁcally,  is the
set of bridge rules between the contexts; i.e., inference rules whose premises and conclusions belong to different contexts:
C1 : A1, . . . ,Cq : Aq
C j : A
meaning that if for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,q} Ak is deduced in context Ck , then A is inferred in C j . Thus, the top of any bridge rule
is the precondition (i.e., the formulas that must hold to apply the bridge rule) and the bottom of the bridge rule is the
postcondition (i.e., the formula that is generated within a context).
Because we want our agents to contend with uncertainty, we will assume graded logics. As a consequence, in this article
we endow multi-context graded BDI agents, proposed by Casali et al. in [12], with capabilities for considering explicit
normative notions in their decisions. As proposed by Casali et al., a multi-context graded BDI agent has mental contexts
to characterise graded beliefs (BC), intentions (IC), and desires (DC). All these contexts contain weighted expressions that
represent the degree of certainty, desirability, or intentionality of mental attitudes:
• Belief Context (BC). It is formed by expressions belonging to the BC-Logic, which was deﬁned by Casali et al. in [12].
The language LBC is deﬁned over a classical propositional language LP (built from a countable set of propositional
variables with connectives → and ¬) which is expanded with a fuzzy modal operator B. Thus, the BC contains logic
propositions such as (B γ ,ρ); where B γ represents a belief about proposition γ ∈ LP , and ρ ∈ [0,1] represents the
certainty degree associated to this belief. The logical connective → is used to represent explanation relationships be-
tween propositions. Thus, (B α → β,ρ) represents that the agent believes that α explains β , with a certainty degree ρ;
i.e., the agent believes the probability α causes β is ρ .
• Desire Context (DC). In the original proposal of Casali et al. [12] a many value modal logic to represent and reason about
agent bipolar preferences (i.e., positive and negative desires) is deﬁned. For the purpose of this article, we just require
a single fuzzy modal operator D for representing desires. Thus, the DC contains logic propositions such as (D γ ,ρ);
where D γ represents a desire about proposition γ ∈ LP , and ρ ∈ [0,1] represents the desirability degree. Thus,
negative desires are represented using the negation connective ¬ (i.e., (D ¬γ ,ρ)). Degrees of desires allow setting
different levels of preference or rejection.
• Intention Context (IC). It is formed by expressions belonging to the IC-Logic [12]. Thus, it is formed by graded intentions
that are denoted by (I γ ,ρ), where ρ ∈ [0,1] may be considered as the truth degree of the expression “γ is intended
through the best plan to reach γ ”. Thus, the intentionality degree of a proposition γ must be the consequence of ﬁnding
a best feasible plan that permits a state of the world where γ holds to be achieved.
The logic of mental contexts is a mixture of ﬁrst-order modal logic [44], which is employed to represent those propositions
that are believed, desired, or intended; and Rational Pavelka Logic (RPL) [39] to represent the probability of propositions.
Therefore, the axioms and rules are built by considering axioms of ﬁrst-order predicate logic and axioms of RPL.2 Deduction
rules for each context are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for the mental modalities B, D, I . For a complete description
of these contexts see [12].
In the proposed case study, the theory of the ﬁreman agent is formed by:
• Graded beliefs that represent its beliefs about environment in which it is situated: e.g., its perceptions. For example, it
has beliefs about the ﬁre condition or the victims that are situated in its surroundings. Moreover, the ﬁreman knows
explanation relationships between beliefs. These relationships allow the ﬁremen agent to represent the potential conse-
quences of actions or states. For example, the ﬁreman agent knows its survival probability if it aborts the rescue. It also
knows the probability of saving one more victim if it continues with the rescue.
• Graded desires that represent the agent preferences; i.e., its intrinsic goals. The ﬁreman has desires that represent how
much it wants to protect its own life and how much it wants to preserve victims’ life.
• Graded intentions that represent the deliberative state of the agent. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁreman knows plans for aborting
the rescue and plans for carrying on the rescue. Thus, the ﬁreman agent can generate intentions on-line to abort the
rescue and to continue with the rescue depending on its circumstances (i.e., its beliefs and desires).
Let us suppose that there is a ﬁreman working in a speciﬁc building (gateHouse). Table 1 shows an example of the ﬁre-
man beliefs, desires and intentions (see rows corresponding to contexts BC, DC and IC) at a given moment of the rescue.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁreman agent believes that the situation is somehow risky—(B risky(gateHouse),0.5). It also believes that
it has 50% probability of survival if it aborts the rescue—(B abort(gateHouse) → survive(self ),0.5). Since the closest victim
2 RPL is an extension of Lukasiewicz’s inﬁnitely-valued logic by expanding its language with rational truth-constants to explicitly reason about degrees
of truth [29].
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Theory of the ﬁreman agent (using the n-BDI architecture).
Context Content
BC (B risky(gateHouse),0.5)
(B abort(gateHouse) → survive(self ),0.5)
(B ¬abort(gateHouse) → survive(victims),0.25)
(B play(self ,ﬁreman),1)
(B inform(expert1,norm(nﬁreAbortion) ∧ salience(0.75)),1)
(B inform(expert2,norm(nﬁreAbortion) ∧ salience(0.2)),1)
(B inform(expert3,norm(nﬁreAbortion) ∧ salience(0.8)),1)
DC (D survive(victims),1), (D survive(self ),1)
IC (I continue(gateHouse),1)
NAC normOpinion(nﬁreAbortion, expert1,0.75)
normOpinion(nﬁreAbortion, expert2,0.2)
normOpinion(nﬁreAbortion, expert3,0.8)
norm(nﬁreAbortion,0.64)
NRC instance(iﬁreAbortion,0.32)
is quite far from the ﬁreman position, it believes that it has low probabilities of saving one more victim if it continues
with the rescue—(B ¬abort(gateHouse) → survive(victims),0.25). The rest of beliefs can be ignored at this moment. This
ﬁreman considers equally important the lives of the victims and its own life; i.e., it desires the survival of victims and itself
with the highest desirability—(D survive(victims),1) and (D survive(self ),1). Finally, it has an intention to continue with the
rescue—(I continue(gateHouse),1).
The reasoning process in a multi-context graded BDI agent is mainly performed by bridge rules that connect mental
contexts. Thus, the information ﬂows from perception to action via bridge rules that deﬁne how the information that is
represented inside several contexts is combined for inferring new information in other contexts. The reasoning process
can be summarised into three different phases. In the ﬁrst one, the agent perceptions are used for updating the agent
knowledge. In the second phase, desires are updated. In the third phase, the agent makes a decision about the next action
to be performed.
Phase 1. Perception. The agent perceives the environment and translates this perception into new formulae that are in-
serted in those contexts that are responsible for representing the agent environment. The perception process is
illustrated in Fig. 1(a) (see the white circle and the white box). This image shows how the different contexts (i.e.,
circles) are connected by means of bridge rules (i.e., boxes). Speciﬁcally, the belief revision bridge rules change
beliefs to take into account new pieces of information.
Phase 2. Deliberation. In this phase desires that represent the motivations of agents are updated (see the white circles and
the white box of Fig. 1(b)). Speciﬁcally, the option generation bridge rules determine the options available to the
agent (its desires) on the basis of its current beliefs about its environment and its current intentions.
Phase 3. Decision making. The intention ﬁlter bridge rules determine the agent’s intentions on the basis of its current
beliefs, desires, and intentions. Finally, the action selection bridge rules determine an action to perform on the basis
of current intentions. An overview of the decision making phase is illustrated in Fig. 1(c).
This article is not aimed at providing an exhaustive description of how the multi-context graded BDI agent reasons.
Therefore, only those aspects that are relevant to the normative extensions that we propose have been described. For a
complete description of the logic of the contexts and the bridge rules deﬁned by Casali et al. see [12].3
2.3. Normative deﬁnitions
Norms help to deﬁne control, coordination and cooperation mechanisms that attempt to: (i) promote behaviours that
are satisfactory to the organisation, i.e., actions that contribute to the achievement of global goals; and (ii) avoid harmful
actions, i.e., actions that prompt the system to be unsatisfactory or unstable. Norms have been studied from different
perspectives such as philosophy [49], sociology [43], law [1], etc. MAS research has given different meanings to the norm
concept. For example, it has been employed as a synonym of obligation and authorisation [20], social law [35], social
commitment [46] and other kinds of rules imposed by societies or authorities. The purpose of this paper is not to propose,
compare or improve existing normative deﬁnitions, but to make use of these deﬁnitions for proposing an information
model, knowledge representation and inference mechanism to allow agents to reason about norms under uncertainty within
3 Note that the logic proposed in [12] has not been created for building agents endowed with normative reasoning capabilities. Therefore, this logic does
not deal with norms.
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[12] (i.e., the contexts BC,DC, IC) are represented as white circles. Similarly, the bridge rules deﬁned by Casali et al. in [12] are represented as white boxes,
where: the input links represent the precondition of the bridge rules, and the output links represent the postcondition of the bridge rules. The normative
contexts and the normative bridge rules, that we propose in this paper, are represented as grey circles and boxes.
dynamic environments. The aim of this section is to provide the reader with the basic normative notions used in this
paper.
In this paper we consider norms as formal statements that deﬁne patterns of behaviours by means of deontic modalities
(i.e., obligations and prohibitions). Speciﬁcally, our proposal is based on the notion of norm as a general rule of behaviour
that deﬁnes under which circumstances a pattern of behaviour becomes relevant and must be instantiated. This notion of
norm has been widely used by the existing literature [31,33,38].
To express norms in a general form, we make use of a ﬁrst-order predicate language L that is built by extending the
classical propositional language LP with an inﬁnite set of variables. In addition, the alphabet contains predicate, constant
and function symbols. Variables are implicitly universally quantiﬁed.4 In this article variables are written as any sequence of
alphanumeric characters beginning with a capital letter. Let us also assume the standard notion of substitution of variables;
i.e., a substitution σ is a ﬁnite and possibly empty set of pairs Y /y where Y is a variable and y is a term [23]. The predicate,
constant and function symbols are written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters beginning with a lower case letter.
Speciﬁcally, there are constant symbols that identify roles and agents. Thus, R and A are the sets containing all role and
agent identiﬁers, respectively. For the purpose of this paper it is necessary to know that the relationship between agents
and roles is formally represented by a binary predicate (play). Speciﬁcally, the expression play(a, r) describes the fact that
the agent identiﬁed by a ∈A enacts the role identiﬁed by r ∈R.
2.3.1. Norm deﬁnition
Given the informal deﬁnition of norm and the logic preliminaries given above, a norm is formally deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1 (Norm). A norm (n) is deﬁned as a tuple n = 〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉, where:
• D ∈ {O,F} is the deontic modality of the norm, determining if the norm is an obligation (O) or prohibition (F );
• C is a wff of L that represents the norm condition, i.e., it denotes the goal or action that is controlled by the norm;
• T ∈R is the target of the norm; i.e., the role to which the norm is addressed;
• A is a wff of L that describes the activation condition;
• E is a wff of L that describes the expiration condition;
• S is a wff of L that describes the sanction that will be applied to the target agents if the norm is not fulﬁlled;
• R is a wff of L that describes the reward that will be provided to the target agents if the norm is fulﬁlled.
4 Note that the appropriate use of Skolem functions [36] allows all existential quantiﬁers to be removed without loss of expressivity.
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default. Therefore, only obligation and prohibition norms are considered by our proposal. These norms deﬁne exceptions to
this default permission rule.5
For example, the norm that obliges ﬁremen to abort the ﬁre-rescue when the situation becomes too risky is formally
deﬁned as:〈O,abort(R),ﬁreman, risky(R),ﬁreExtinguished(R),−,−〉 (nﬁreAbortion)
We have assumed that once a rescue R is consider as a risky situation, then the norm is active. The norm expires when the
ﬁre has been extinguished. This norm determines when ﬁremen are obliged to abort a rescue and, as a consequence, this
norm allows ﬁreman to create intentions to abort the rescue.
2.3.2. Instance deﬁnition
Once the activation conditions of a norm hold it becomes relevant and several instances, according to the possible
groundings of the activation condition, must be created. Thus, instances are unconditional expressions that bind a particular
agent to an obligation or prohibition. Formally an instance is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2 (Instance). Given a norm n = 〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉 and a theory Γ ⊆ LP , an instance of n is the tuple i =
〈D,C ′,AgentID, A′, E ′, S ′, R ′〉 where:
• Γ 
 σ(A) where σ is a substitution of variables in A such that σ(A) is a logical consequence of Γ and σ(A), σ(E),
σ(C), σ(S), σ(R) are grounded;
• A′ = σ(A), E ′ = σ(E), C ′ = σ(C), S ′ = σ(S) and R ′ = σ(R);
• AgentID ∈A is an agent identiﬁer that corresponds to the agent affected by the norm, which is playing the target role T .
When a norm is instantiated it must be grounded. In order to ensure that all instances have no free variables, in any
norm 〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉 the variables that occur in E,C, S, R must be contained in A (i.e., v A ⊇ vE ∪ vC ∪ v S ∪ vR ). We
denote v X as the set of variables occurring in any formula X .
Remember, that the ﬁreman believes that the rescue is risky (see the ﬁrst belief in Table 1). In this case, the norm that
obliges ﬁremen to abort the ﬁre-rescue is instantiated as follows:〈O,abort(gateHouse), self , risky(gateHouse),ﬁreExtinguished(gateHouse),−,−〉 (iﬁreAbortion)
Any agent identiﬁes itself by the self constant. This instance states that the ﬁreman is obliged to abort the operation rescue
that it is carrying out in the gateHouse building until the ﬁre has been extinguished.
In this section, the basic notions used in this article have been provided. In the next sections we propose the normative
extensions made to the multi-context graded BDI architecture and we explain how these extensions allow the development
of norm-autonomous agents capable of reasoning about norms under uncertainty within dynamic environments.
3. Normative multi-context graded BDI architecture
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, there is a need for norm-autonomous agents that are capable of rea-
soning about norms under uncertainty within dynamic environments. To address this need, in this paper we propose the
Normative Multi-context Graded BDI Architecture (or n-BDI for short) [18], which is formed by: mental contexts, which have
been described in the previous section; and normative contexts for allowing agents to acquire and maintain norms (NAC),
and to consider instances created out of relevant norms in their decision making processes (NRC).
3.1. Normative contexts
To endow multi-context graded BDI agents with contexts for representing and reasoning about normative notions, we
have considered the work of Sripada et al. [47] as a reference. In this work Sripada et al. analyse the psychological architec-
ture subserving norms. In particular, this architecture is formed by two closely linked innate mechanisms: one responsible
for norm acquisition, and the other maintains a database of those instances that have been created out of relevant norms.
To allow agents to have an explicit representation of norms and instances and to consider them in their reasoning
process, additional contexts are needed. We have decided to represent norms and instances separately in two dedicated
contexts due to two main reasons. Firstly, we consider that representing norms and instances independently of other mental
attitudes allows us to explain the norm reasoning with more clarity: i.e., we are able to deﬁne explicitly the relationships
among norms, instances and the other contexts. Secondly, the explicit distinction between instances and norms allows us to
illustrate the differences between them; i.e., they have a different deﬁnition, semantics and dynamics and are considered in
different steps of the reasoning process. Speciﬁcally, the two normative contexts are:
5 Note that we might have used permission norms to create exceptions to the application of more general obligation and prohibition norms. However,
the resolution of exceptions among norms is beyond the scope of this paper and has been addressed by other works such as [31].
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• Norm Relevance Context (NRC). This is the component responsible for maintaining the instances that have been created
out of relevant norms at a speciﬁc moment.
3.2. Reasoning process in an n-BDI agent
The reasoning process in an n-BDI agent is mainly performed by bridge rules that connect mental and normative
contexts. As multi-context graded BDI agents, n-BDI agents also carry out a reasoning process in three different phases.
Speciﬁcally, in n-BDI agents the perception and deliberation phases have been extended with new bridge rules:
Phase 1. Perception. The new bridge rules that we add to the perception process are represented by the grey elements of
Fig. 1(a):
• Norm acquisition bridge rules. These bridge rules are responsible for inferring the norms that are in force in the
agent environment.
• Norm relevance bridge rules. These bridge rules create instances out of the norms are relevant (i.e., are pertinent)
to the current situation.
Phase 2. Deliberation. The new bridge rules that we add to the deliberation process are represented by the grey elements
of Fig. 1(b):
• Norm compliance bridge rules. The norm compliance bridge rules determine the instances that the n-BDI agent
wants to obey. Then, the obeyed instances are propagated to the agent’s desires.
As previously mentioned, the n-BDI architecture has been formalised as a multi-context system, which allows different
logics to be used in different contexts. In the following sections, the logics used by normative logics are deﬁned as well as
the bridge rules that deﬁne the relationship between normative contexts and mental contexts.
4. Norm Acquisition Context (NAC)
According to Conte et al. [16], the problem of acquiring norms6 entails the evaluation of candidate norms against several
criteria. For example, a norm must be rejected if the agent that issues the norm is a non-recognised authority and, as a
consequence, the majority of agents do not consider this norm important.
In our proposal, the Norm Acquisition Context (NAC) allows agents to maintain a norm base that contains current norms;
i.e., the legislation that is in force at a given moment. Speciﬁcally, the NAC receives information from the environment,
determines whether that information is relevant to norms that regulate the agent’s environment and updates, accordingly,
the existing set of norms (i.e., adding the new norms and deleting the obsolete ones).
For example, the ﬁreman agent must be capable of participating in ﬁre-rescue operations in different regions and coun-
tries. Each region or country has its own ﬁre-rescue norms. Moreover, ﬁre-rescue norms are occasionally modiﬁed. For
example, the ﬁre-rescue strategy can be modiﬁed according to the features of the ﬁre that is being fought. For these rea-
sons the ﬁreman must be endowed with mechanisms that allow it to update the set of norms that regulate ﬁre-rescue
operations. Moreover, the fact that the ﬁreman agent is capable of acquiring norms on-line implies a greater ﬂexibility and
a reduced load at the level of the agents’ knowledge bases [16].
Norm acquisition. Computational models of norm acquisition receive the agent perceptions and identify the set of norms
that control the agent environment. Perceptions which are relevant to the norm recognition may be classiﬁed into: (i) explicit
normative perceptions, which correspond to those messages exchanged by agents in which norms are explicitly communi-
cated; and (ii) implicit normative perceptions, which correspond to the observation of actions performed by agents.
n-BDI agents consider only explicit normative information (i.e., those messages exchanged by agents in which norms are
explicitly communicated) as the only source of information for inferring norms. Speciﬁcally, n-BDI agents are informed by
expert agents (or experts for short) about the current norms. Experts provide information about the creation (issuance) and
elimination (abolition) of norms that regulate their environment. Besides that, the set of current norms may change both
explicitly, by means of the addition, deletion or modiﬁcation of the existing norms; and implicitly by introducing new
norms which are not speciﬁcally meant to modify previous norms, but which change in fact the system because they are
incompatible with such existing norms and prevail over them [28]. However, this is a complex issue which is out of the
scope of this article.7 For simplicity, we do not consider here incompatibility relationships among norms.
Norm acceptance. The term norm salience was deﬁned by Campenní et al. in [11] as “the degree of activity and importance
of a norm within a social group and a given context”. As psychological [15,5] and behavioural economics [6,50] studies
6 Note that the norm acquisition process has been also called norm recognition process. For example, Campenní et al. in [11] refer to this process by
using the term norm recognition. Within the MAS and psychological ﬁeld the term acquisition norm has been widely used, e.g., both Conte et al. and
Sripada et al. refer to it in [17] and [47], respectively. Given that our proposal highly is inspired by these two works, we have adopted the term norm
acquisition in this article.
7 Proposals presented at the Formal Models of Norm Change (http://www.cs.uu.nl/events/normchange2/) are good examples of proposals which provide a
formal analysis of all kinds of dynamic aspects involved in systems of norms.
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of salience of norms in order to make appropriate decisions about which norms to accept. For this reason, n-BDI agents
represent norms together with their salience.
All ﬁre-rescue norms are not equally important. Thus, the ﬁreman agent needs to represent and consider the salience
of ﬁre-rescue norms to decide which norms are less important and can be violated if necessary. Moreover, the relative
importance among these norms is a social factor that changes from one region to other. Finally, there are speciﬁc moments
(e.g., summer) or facts (e.g., when the population is shaken by a ﬁre that has made a great impact) that may affect the
importance that the society gives to ﬁre-rescue norms.
The salience of norms can vary depending on social and individual factors. The estimation of the norm salience is not
trivial and it is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, we have assumed that the norm salience is estimated by experts
which provide this information to n-BDI agents.
Since the identiﬁcation of norms and the determination of their salience is a complex problem, it seems appropriate that
n-BDI agents consider the information sent by multiple experts, since multiple experts can provide more information than
a single expert.
4.1. NAC language
4.1.1. Syntax
The NAC contains the set of in force norms making use of two normative predicates: the opinion predicate, which is used
for representing the salience that each expert assigns to a norm; and the norm predicate, which is used for representing
the salience that the n-BDI agent assigns to a norm. Thus, the NAC is formed by expressions such as norm(n,ρ), where n
is a norm and ρ ∈ [0,1] is a real value that represents the salience of this norm. The NAC also contains expressions such
as opinion(n, j,ρ) where n is a norm, j identiﬁes the expert that has provided the opinion and ρ ∈ [0,1] is the salience
value that expert j has expressed for norm n. These two types of expressions are closely related. In particular, the opinions
provided by experts are used by n-BDI agents to estimate the salience of norms.
4.1.2. Semantics
We deﬁne the semantics of the NAC language using operational semantics8 [40]. Speciﬁcally, the operational semantics
of the NAC is given by a set of rules that deﬁne a transition relationships between conﬁgurations 〈Opinion,Norm〉 of the
NAC where:
• Opinion is a set of norm opinions, where each opinion is an expression such as opinion(n, j,ρ) that represents the
salience (ρ) that an expert j assigns to a norm n.
• Norm is a set of norm(n,ρ) expressions that represent the salience (ρ) that the agent assigns to a norm n.
In the general case, in the agent’s initial conﬁguration both Opinion and Norm are empty. The operational rules for the NAC
language formalise the transitions between possible conﬁgurations of the NAC as follows:
preCond
Conf → Conf ′
where the top of the rule—represented by the expression preCond—is a boolean expression that represents the precondi-
tion of the rule, and the bottom of the rule—represented by the expression Conf → Conf ′—deﬁnes the transitions between
conﬁgurations: i.e., how the initial conﬁguration—represented by the expression Conf—changes once the rule is applied—
represented by the expression Conf ′ .
Norm opinion operational rules. The inference process of the NAC starts when a new norm opinion is generated. When an
expert provides its ﬁrst opinion about a norm, then the opinion is directly inserted into the NAC according to the following
operational rule:
opinion(n, j,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ρ ′ : opinion(n, j,ρ ′) ∈ Opinion
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion′,Norm〉
Opinion′ = Opinion∪ {opinion(n, j,ρ)}
(a)
where f is a function that returns the set of formulas that are inferred by the bridge rules () according to the information
present in the contexts of an n-BDI agent (i.e., in the ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC and ΓNRC).
8 Operational semantics has been widely used for specifying norm semantics in MAS [2,48]. Moreover, operational semantics describes how the logic
statements are used by sequences of computational steps, which has facilitated us the use of a functional programming language to implement our
architecture and perform experiments to assess empirically our proposal.
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to the following operational rule:
opinion(n, j,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ ′ : opinion(n, j,ρ ′) ∈ Opinion
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion′,Norm〉
Opinion′ = Opinion \ {opinion(n, j,ρ ′)} ∪ {opinion(n, j,ρ)}
(a*)
Norm operational rules. There are also operational rules that deﬁne the process by which the inferred norms are inserted
inside the NAC. If a norm is inferred for the ﬁrst time, then it is inserted into the NAC as indicated by the following
operational rule:
norm(n,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ρ ′ : norm(n,ρ ′) ∈ Norm
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion,Norm′〉
Norm′ = Norm∪ {norm(n,ρ)}
(b)
Later, when the same norm is deduced again, then the norm set is updated according to the following operational rule:
norm(n,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ ′ : norm(n,ρ ′) ∈ Norm
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion,Norm′〉
Norm′ = Norm \ {norm(n,ρ ′)} ∪ {norm(n,ρ)}
(b*)
Both the syntax and the operational rules of the NAC have been explained in this section. Next, we describe the norm
acquisition bridge rules that infer the opinions and the norms that trigger the execution of these operational rules.
4.2. Norm acquisition bridge rules
The process by which n-BDI agents update the norms and their salience is performed by a set of bridge rules that are
applied any time the agent receives a message that informs about a change in the normative system (i.e., the set of norms
that are in force). Therefore, these bridge rules (named as norm acquisition bridge rules in Fig. 1(a)) relate the belief context
(BC)—in which received messages are inserted—to the NAC—which contains the mental representation of norms. Speciﬁcally,
two norm acquisition bridge rules are applied by n-BDI agents: (i) norm opinion, and (ii) salience aggregation bridge rules.
4.2.1. Norm opinion bridge rule
Communication related to the information about norms is considered by the norm opinion bridge rule for generating
norm opinion expressions. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne this rule as follows:
BC : (B inform( J ,norm(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉) ∧ salience(ρ)),ρBC) ∧ ρBC  δValidity
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉, J ,ρ)
If an agent is informed by another agent (the expert) J about the existence of a norm—represented by the expression
norm(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉) ∧ salience(ρ)—, then this information must be employed for generating a new norm opinion.
ρ is the salience that the expert assigns to the norm and ρBC is the validity of the message. The validity of messages is
determined in terms of their integrity, i.e., it can be calculated depending on several factors such as the security of the
channel through it has been received, the possibility of identifying the provenance of the message, etc. Determining the
validity of messages is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity, we deﬁne that only those messages whose validity is
higher or equal to a validity threshold—represented by the expression δValidity—are taken into account by the norm opinion
bridge rule.
If the expert has not informed previously about this norm, Rule (a) is executed and a new opinion is inserted inside the
NAC. Later, the expert might change the norm salience. In this case, the opinion that is stored in the NAC is updated as
indicated by Rule (a*).
An expert considers that a norm has been abolished when it believes that the norm is not important anymore. Thus,
experts inform n-BDI agents about the deletion of norms by sending messages in which they indicate that the salience of
the abolished norm is 0.
For example, the ﬁreman is informed by three experts9 (expert1, expert2 and expert3) that have different opinions about
the salience of the rescue abortion norm (see the last three beliefs in Table 1). These messages have the maximum reliability
and are considered by the norm opinion bridge rule. This bridge rule is applied for each one of the experts and, as a
consequence, three norm opinion expressions are inserted inside the NAC (see the ﬁrst three expressions in row NAC of
Table 1).
9 For example, these three experts can be its instructior in the ﬁre department, its boss at the ﬁre station and the leader of its ﬁre brigade. Each one of
these experts may have their own view about the importance of the norm and therefore they provide the agent with three different opinions.
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As previously stated, opinions from experts are considered for determining the salience that n-BDI agents assign to
norms. Speciﬁcally, we propose that all opinions sent by different experts about the same norm are combined by the
salience aggregation bridge rule as follows:
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉, J1,ρ1)
· · ·
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉, J K ,ρK )
NAC : norm(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉, fAggregation({ρ1, . . . , ρK }))
This bridge rule will be executed any time an opinion changes. The fAggregation function aggregates opinions of experts by
using a robust aggregation operator that reduces the impact of outlier experts. Speciﬁcally, all opinions are combined using
the Robust Linear Opinion Pool (R-LOP) technique proposed by García et al. in [24]. Speciﬁcally, the R-LOP measures the
conﬂict level introduced by every expert by taking into account the similarity between its opinion and expertise level, and
the other experts. The calculation of the expertise levels is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we assume that agents
consider that all experts have the same expertise level. In this case the R-LOP technique is applied as follows.
Given a set of K elements Ψ = {ψ1, . . . ,ψK }, where each ψ1 ∈ [0,1]; the similarity between one of the elements in Ψ
and the other elements is deﬁned as:
Simi(Ψ ) = Sim
(
ψi,Ψ \ {ψi}
)= 1− 1
K − 1
K∑
j=1, j =i
|ψi − ψk|
Let us consider that there are K independent experts that express their opinion about salience of a given norm. Let
O = {ρ1, . . . , ρK }, where each ρ j ∈ [0,1], represents the salience values given by the different experts about the same norm.
An expert who disagrees with the majority of other experts is assumed to be conﬂicting (i.e., it is an “outlier” expert). Based
on this, the reliability of each expert j is calculated as follows:
Reliability j = Sim j(O)
Basically, the reliability of an expert represents to what extent this expert can be trusted because it behaves well as a norm
expert.
The aggregated salience is obtained by the fAggregation function as the weighted average of the salience values, with the
weights being the reliability levels determined as before:
Deﬁnition 3 (Aggregation function). Given a set O = {ρ1, . . . , ρK }, where each ρ j ∈ [0,1] represents the set of salience values
given by the different experts about the same norm; the aggregated salience is a real function deﬁned as follows:
fAggregation(O) =
∑K
j=1 o j × Reliability j∑K
j=1 Reliability j
According to the norm opinions that the ﬁreman agent knows (see the ﬁrst three expressions in row NAC of Table 1),
the set of opinions is O = {0.75,0.2,0.8}. The similarities between each one of the salience values in O and the other two
values is Sim(O ) = {0.7,0.425,0.675}. According to these similarities, the second expert is the least reliable and its opinion
must be less considered. As a consequence, the combined salience is more inﬂuenced by the other two experts and takes
0.64.10 Thus, the salience aggregation bridge rule generates the last expression in row NAC of Table 1.
5. Norm Relevance Context (NRC)
The Norm Relevance Context (NRC) is the component responsible for maintaining the instances that have been created
out of relevant norms. Thus, the NAC recognises all norms that are in force, whereas the NRC only contains those instances
which are active according to the current situation.
For example, ﬁre-rescue norms are general norms that are not always active. Some of them, such as the nﬁreAbortion
norm, only come into effect under speciﬁc circumstances; e.g., in risky situations. What is considered as a risky situation is
ambiguous. Therefore, there are norms that come into effect under uncertain circumstances. As a result, the ﬁreman agent
needs to be able to detect the activation and expiration conditions on the basis of uncertain beliefs. This section illustrates
how n-BDI agents manage the activation and expiration of norms under uncertainty.
10 fAggregation({0.75,0.2,0.8}) = (0.75×0.7)+(0.2×0.425)+(0.8×0.675)0.7+0.425+0.675 = 0.64.
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5.1.1. Syntax
The NRC contains information about instances using the instance predicate. Thus, it contains expressions such as:
instance(i,ρ) where i is an instance and ρ ∈ [0,1] is a real value that represents the relevance degree of the instance
(i.e., the degree in which the instance is pertinent to the current circumstances of the agent).
5.1.2. Semantics
Again, we deﬁne the operational semantics of the NRC language by a set of operational rules that deﬁne a transition
relationship between conﬁgurations 〈Instance〉 of the NRC where:
• Instance is a set of instances, where each instance is an expression such as instance(i,ρ) where i is an instance and ρ
is the certainty degree of the instance.
In the general case, an agent’s initial conﬁguration is 〈Instance〉 where Instance is empty.
Instance operational rules. The reasoning cycle starts when a new instance is generated (the process by which instances
are inferred in the NRC by norm relevance bridge rules is described below in Section 5.2). Since this is the ﬁrst time that an
instance is deduced, it is inserted into the NRC according to the following operational rule:
instance(i,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ρ ′ : instance(i,ρ ′) ∈ Instance
〈Instance〉 −→ 〈Instance′〉
Instance′ = Instance∪ {instance(i,ρ)}
(c)
When an instance that already belongs to the NRC is deduced again, then the instance set is updated according to the
following operational rule:
instance(i,ρ) ∈ f(ΓBC,ΓDC,ΓIC,ΓNAC,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ ′ : instance(i,ρ ′) ∈ Instance
〈Instance〉 −→ 〈Instance′〉
Instance′ = Instance \ {instance(i,ρ ′)} ∪ {instance(i,ρ)}
(c*)
The language that allows instances to be represented in the NRC has been explained in this section. Next, we describe
the bridge rules that infer instances inside the NRC causing the execution of the NRC operational rules.
5.2. Norm relevance bridge rules
As stated before, norms are not always active. Thus, instances are created inside the agents’ mind when the agent
has beliefs that sustain the activation of norms. Similarly, norms also include an expiration condition that deﬁnes the
validity period or deadline of instances. Thus, agents must believe that a given instance has expired in order to delete its
mental representation. As illustrated by Fig. 1(a), norm relevance bridge rules relate the agent beliefs (BC) and the mental
representation of norms (NAC) to infer instances (NRC). Speciﬁcally, two norm relevance bridge rules are executed by n-BDI
agents: (i) instance activation and (ii) instance expiration bridge rules.
5.2.1. Instance activation bridge rules
When the agent knows a norm and it believes that there is an agent, which can be itself, under the inﬂuence of this
norm (i.e., there is an agent that enacts the target role of the norm) and the norm is relevant to the current situation; then
a new instance must be created. To model this reasoning process we deﬁne the norm relevance bridge rule as follows:
NAC : norm(〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉,ρNAC),
BC : (Bσ(A),ρσ(A)),BC : (B play(AgentID, T ),ρT )
NRC : instance(〈D,σ (C),AgentID,σ (A),σ (E),σ (S),σ (R)〉, fRelevance(ρNAC,ρσ(A), ρT ))
If an agent considers that a norm—represented by the expression 〈D,C, T , A, E, S, R〉—is currently active—i.e., there is a
substitution σ such as the expression (Bσ(A),ρσ(A)) is deduced in BC; where σ(A) denotes the result of applying σ to A,
and ρσ(A) is a real number within the [0,1] interval representing the certainty about this belief—and the agent knows that
there is an agent—represented by the expression AgentID—that it is under the inﬂuence of the norm—i.e., the expression
(B play(AgentID, T ),ρT ) is deduced in BC; where play(AgentID, T ) denotes fact that AgentID is playing role T , and ρT is a
real number within the [0,1] interval representing the certainty about this belief—, then a new instance is generated.11
11 Note that n-BDI agents create instances that affect them and also instances that affect other agents. It allows n-BDI agents to be aware of which norms
affect other agents, which can be useful for predicting and evaluating the behaviour of their interaction partners. However, this predicting and evaluating
feature is beyond the scope of this article.
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fRelevance is deﬁned as a numerical fusion operator13 that can be given different deﬁnitions depending on the properties
that are required in each concrete application. In particular, the relevance degree assigned by the fRelevance function is a
combination among the salience of the norm—represented by the expression ρNAC—, the certainty about the activation of
the norm—represented by the expression ρσ(A)—and the certainty about the fact that the agent is affected by the norm—
represented by the expression ρT . In this article, we assume that the conditions that are necessary to create an instance
(i.e., the existence of an important norm and the two beliefs) are independent (e.g., the consideration of a norm as impor-
tant does not imply that the activation condition of this norm holds). Given that the intersection or join certainty about
independent events is the product among the event certainties, we deﬁne the combination among the uncertain values that
cause the instantiation of a norm as follows:
fRelevance(ρNAC,ρσ(A), ρT ) = ρNAC × ρσ(A) × ρT
According to the information in Table 1, the ﬁreman is completely sure about being acting as a ﬁreman (see the fourth
belief in row BC). Moreover, it considers that it participates in a risky rescue with a 50% of probability (see the ﬁrst belief
in row BC). Therefore, the instance activation bridge rule is applied as follows14:
NAC : norm(〈O,abort(R),ﬁreman, risky(R),ﬁreExtingished(R),−,−〉,0.64),
BC : (B risky(gateHouse),0.5),BC : (B play(self ,ﬁreman),1)
NRC : instance(〈O,abort(gateHouse),ﬁreman, risky(gateHouse),
ﬁreExtingished(gateHouse),−,−〉, fRelevance(0.64,0.5,1))
where σ = {R/gateHouse}. Thus, a new instance is generated. The relevance of this new instance is 0.32.15 This instance
triggers the execution of the operational Rule (b), and, as a consequence, the NRC contains the following expression (see
row NRC of Table 1):
instance
(〈O,abort(gateHouse),ﬁreman, risky(gateHouse),ﬁreExtingished(gateHouse),−,−〉,0.32)
5.2.2. Instance expiration bridge rule
Once the expiration condition of an instance holds, then the certainty of the instance must be reduced. To model this
reasoning process we deﬁne the instance expiration bridge rule as follows:
NRC : instance(〈D,C,AgentID, A, E, S, R〉,ρNRC),
BC : (B E,ρE)
NRC : instance(〈D,C,AgentID, A, E, S, R〉,
fExpiration(ρNRC,ρE ))
If the NRC of an agent contains an instance—represented by the expression instance(〈D,C,AgentID, A, E, S, R〉,ρNRC)—and
it has a belief that sustains its expiration—represented by the expression (B E,ρE)—, then the degree of the instance must be
reduced.16 Speciﬁcally, the belief (B E,ρE) disconﬁrms with the instance. Thus, any fusion operator that combines evidences
that conﬁrm and disconﬁrm a hypothesis can be used. In this paper we use a simple fusion operator that reduces the
relevance of the instance by the certainty of the disconﬁrming belief. Thus, we deﬁne the fExpiration function as follows:
fExpiration(ρNRC,ρE) = max(0,ρNRC − ρE)
Therefore, the fExpiration : [0,1]× [0,1] → [0,1] is a function such that [45] the unit element is 0, which is an information
that says nothing and does not inﬂuence the combination. If there is a high certainty about the expiration of the instance,
the relevance degree of the instance would become 0. In this case, the instance would no longer be considered by the n-BDI
agent.
In the n-BDI proposal the notion of role has been used to deﬁne the sphere of inﬂuence of norms. The use of norms for
deﬁning the responsibilities, duties and rights of roles has been proposed also in other works such as [33,37,22]. Similarly,
in the n-BDI proposal, activation and expiration conditions have been used to deﬁne the period in which norms come into
effect. Activation and expiration conditions have been considered in other well-known proposals on normative agents [33,
37,31]. However, all of these previous proposals do not consider that agents have an uncertain knowledge of the world.
Therefore, only the n-BDI proposal confronts with the activation and expiration of norms under uncertainty.
12 For the purpose of this paper it is only necessary to know that n-BDI agents have graded beliefs that represent their knowledge about the environment
and the roles played by agents in the environment. The process by which agents use their perceptions for inferring these beliefs is beyond the scope of
this paper.
13 For a review and classiﬁcation of data fusion operators see [7].
14 nﬁreAdoption was deﬁned in Section 2.3.
15 fRelevance(0.64,0.5,1) = 0.64× 0.5× 1 = 0.32.
16 Note that the expiration condition of any instance is grounded and, as a consequence, no substitution is applied in the instance expiration bridge rule.
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Once norms have been instantiated and their relevance has been determined, an n-BDI agent must decide whether it
observes or violates each speciﬁc instance (i.e. it makes a decision about norm compliance) and how its behaviour will be
modiﬁed according to its decision (e.g., to comply with an obligation instance). To model this reasoning process we propose
the norm compliance bridge rules. These rules are executed once a new instance has been created or an existing instance has
been updated. Then, the agent makes a decision about norm compliance (i.e., it calculates its willingness to comply with the
instance) and updates its mental state accordingly. The process by which agents extend their mental state according to their
decisions about norm compliance (i.e., according to the instances that they want to follow or transgress) has been described
by the self-determination theory [19] as a dynamic relation between norms and goals. Accordingly, we have considered
the translation of norms into desires. Depending on the desirability degree of these new desires, they may generate new
intentions to be executed or they may be used to select the most suitable plan that achieves another goal that is more
desired.
Norm compliance bridge rules (see Fig. 1(b)) relate instances (NRC) with the agent beliefs (BC) and desires (DC) to infer
new desires according to norms. These bridge rules depend on the deontic modality of the instance that is considered.
Obligation compliance bridge rule. If the agent is affected by an obligation and the agent is willing to comply with this obli-
gation, then desire for reaching the state imposed by the obligation must be created. Speciﬁcally, we propose the following
bridge rule:
NRC : instance(〈O,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ρNRC)
fWillingness(〈O,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D C, fSubjectiveValue(ρNRC, fWillingness(〈O,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC,ΓDC)))
where δCompliance ∈ [0,1] is the norm compliance threshold. The fWillingness function17 calculates the agent willingness to
comply with a given instance as a real value within the [−1,1] interval. When it takes a value higher than δCompliance , it
means that the agent is willing to comply with the obligation. The degree assigned to the new desire inferred from the
obligation instance is calculated by the fSubjectiveValue function.18
Prohibition compliance bridge rule. If the agent is affected by a prohibition and the agent wants to obey it, then a negative
desire must be created to avoid the forbidden state. Speciﬁcally, we propose the following bridge rule:
NRC : instance(〈F,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ρNRC)
fWillingness(〈F,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D ¬C, fSubjectiveValue(ρNRC, fWillingness(〈F,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC,ΓDC)))
As in case of obligations, the degree assigned to the new desire is calculated by the fSubjectiveValue function.
The norm compliance bridge rules, explain how the instances are considered for extending the agent mental state in order
to fulﬁl these instances. There are two key functions for the norm compliance bridge rules: the function that calculates the
willingness to comply with an instance ( fWillingness), and the function that assigns a degree to the new desire ( fSubjectiveValue).
Next, we deﬁne these two functions.
6.1. Willingness function
The results calculated by the fWillingness function represent the agent willingness to comply with norms; i.e., it models
the decisions about norm compliance. To calculate this willingness agents consider the situations that are predicted to occur
when norms are fulﬁlled and violated (i.e., the norm consequences). We deﬁne the consequences of obeying an instance as
follows:
Deﬁnition 4 (Fulﬁlment consequences). Given an instance (〈D,C, self , A, E, S, R〉) and a theory of beliefs (ΓBC), the predicted
consequences of fulﬁlling this instance are deﬁned as follows:
f F
(〈D,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC)=
{ {(C,1), (R,1)} ∪ {(γ j,ρ j) | ∀γ j,ρ j : ΓBC 
 (B C → γ j,ρ j)} if D =O
{(¬C,1), (R,1)} ∪ {(γ j,ρ j) | ∀γ j,ρ j : ΓBC 
 (B ¬C → γ j,ρ j)} if D =F
Thus, the fulﬁlment consequences are a set of pairs (γ ,ρ), where γ ∈ LP represents a situation that is predicted to
occur if the norm is fulﬁlled; and ρ ∈ [0,1] is the probability of this predicted situation. Speciﬁcally, we consider three kind
of consequences:
17 To be explained in Section 6.1.
18 To be explained in Section 6.2.
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condition (C ) that will be achieved with a probability of 1. The direct consequence of an obligation instance is denoted
by the pair (C,1) in the previous deﬁnition; where C is the obliged condition and 1 is the probability in which the C
will be true if the obligation instance is fulﬁlled. In case of a prohibition, obeying this prohibition implies that the norm
condition will be avoided (¬C ). The direct consequence of complying with a prohibition instance is denoted by the pair
(¬C,1) in the previous deﬁnition; where C is the forbidden condition and 1 is the probability in which the ¬C will be
true if the prohibition instance is fulﬁlled.
• Enforcement mechanisms. The reward (R) is another consequence of the norm fulﬁlment. For simplicity, we assume that
there is a perfect enforcement that always punishes offenders and rewards obedience. As a consequence, the probabil-
ity19 of being rewarded is 1. Therefore, the enforcement consequences of fulﬁlling instances are denoted by the pair
(R,1) in the previous deﬁnition; where R is the reward and 1 is the probability in which the R will be true if the
instance is fulﬁlled.
• Indirect consequences. The logical connective → is used to represent explanatory relationships between propositions.
Thus, a belief such as (α → γ j,ρ j) means that the situation or state represented by α explains or causes γ j with a
probability of ρ j . An obligation is obeyed when the norm condition (C ) is achieved. Therefore, the indirect consequences
of obeying the obligation are deﬁned by considering those beliefs such as (B C → γ j,ρ j). Similarly, the indirect conse-
quences of fulﬁlling of a prohibition are calculated by considering those beliefs such as (B ¬C → γ j,ρ j).
We deﬁne the consequences of violating an instance as follows:
Deﬁnition 5 (Violation consequences). Given an instance (〈D,C, self , A, E, S, R〉) and a theory of beliefs (ΓBC), the predicted
consequences of violating this instance are deﬁned as follows:
f V
(〈D,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC)=
{ {(¬C,1), (S,1)} ∪ {(γ j,ρ j) | ∀γ j,ρ j : ΓBC 
 (B ¬C → γ j,ρ j)} if D =O
{(C,1), (S,1)} ∪ {(γ j,ρ j) | ∀γ j,ρ j : ΓBC 
 (B C → γ j,ρ j)} if D =F
Again, the consequences of violating a norm are calculated considering the direct consequence, the enforcement mecha-
nisms (i.e., the sanction) and the indirect consequences of violating the instance. Speciﬁcally, the three kind of consequences
are:
• Direct consequence. In case of an obligation, the direct consequence of the violation of the obligation is the negation of
the norm condition (¬C ). In contrast, violating a prohibition implies that the norm condition will be achieved (C ).
• Enforcement mechanisms. The sanction (S) is another consequence of the norm violation. This consequence is denoted
by the pair (S,1) in the previous deﬁnition.
• Indirect consequences. An obligation is violated when the norm condition (C ) is achieved. Therefore, the indirect con-
sequences of violating the obligation are deﬁned by considering those beliefs such as (B ¬C → γ j,ρ j). Similarly, the
indirect consequences of violating of a prohibition is calculated by considering those beliefs such as (B C → γ j,ρ j).
As previously mentioned, n-BDI agents calculate their willingness to comply with norms considering the consequences
of violating and fulﬁlling an instance. Speciﬁcally, the main factors on the willingness functions are the probability of the
predicted consequences and the desirability (vs. undesirability) of these consequences. We formally deﬁne the willingness
function as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (Willingness function). Given an instance i, a set of beliefs ΓBC , a set of desires ΓDC and an instance i; the agent’s
willingness to follow this instance is calculated by the fWillingness function as follows:
fWillingness(i,ΓBC,ΓDC) =
∑
∀(γ j ,ρ j)∈ f F (i,ΓBC) ρ j ∗ des(γ j,ΓDC)∑
∀(γ j,ρ j)∈ f F (i,ΓBC) ρ j
−
∑
∀(γ j ,ρ j)∈ f V (i,ΓBC) ρ j ∗ des(γ j,ΓDC)∑
∀(γ j,ρ j)∈ f V (i,ΓBC) ρ j
where the function des calculates the desirability of a proposition.20
19 If agents are able to perceive the probability of being punished or rewarded, then these probabilities may be used.
20 The desirability of a proposition is formally deﬁned as:
des(γ ,ΓDC) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ργ − ρ¬γ if ΓDC 
 (γ ,ργ ) and ΓDC 
 (¬γ ,ρ¬γ )
ργ if ΓDC 
 (γ ,ργ ) and ΓDC  (¬γ ,ρ¬γ )
−ρ¬γ if ΓDC 
 (¬γ ,ρ¬γ ) and ΓDC  (γ ,ργ )
0 otherwise
Therefore, the desirability of a proposition γ (i.e., des(γ ,ΓDC)) is a real value within the [−1,1] interval such that: the −1 value means that the
proposition γ is absolutely rejected, a desirability value of 0 means that the agent is indifferent to γ (i.e., it does not beneﬁt from γ ), and 1 means that
the agent has maximum preference on γ .
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within the [−1,1] interval. Speciﬁcally, it considers the desirability of the fulﬁlment consequences minus the desirability of
the violation consequences. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst element of the subtraction in the fWillingness function is an average among
the desirability (denoted by des(γ j,ΓDC)) of the consequences that are predicted to occur if the instance is fulﬁlled.21
Given that all consequences are not predicted to occur with the same probability, the desirability of consequences has been
weighted by the probability of their occurrence (denoted by ρ j). Thus, those consequences more likely to occur are the most
important when calculating the desirability of fulﬁlment consequences. In contrast, the second element of the subtraction in
the fWillingness function is an average among the desirability of the consequences that are predicted to occur if the instance
is violated.22 Again, these desirabilities have been weighted by the probability of their occurrence.
A positive value of fWillingness means that the agent hopes that the fulﬁlment of the instance entails desirable con-
sequences and, as a consequence, sustains the fulﬁlment of the instance. In contrast, a negative value of the fWillingness
function sustains the violation of the instance.
In the proposed case study, the ﬁreman is affected by the iﬁreAbortion instance. This instance causes the execution of the
obligation compliance as follows:
NRC : instance(iﬁreAbortion,0.32)
fWillingness(iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D abort(gateHouse),
fSubjectiveValue(0.32, fWillingness(iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC,ΓDC)))
According to the information that is contained in the ﬁreman theory (see Table 1), the predicted consequences of fulﬁlling
the iﬁreAbortion instance are deﬁned as follows:
f F (iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC) =
{(
abort(gateHouse),1
)}∪ {(survive(self ),0.5)}
Similarly, the predicted consequences of violating i are deﬁned as follows:
f V (iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC) =
{(¬abort(gateHouse),1)}∪ {(survive(victims),0.25)}
Since the iﬁreAbortion instance is not enforced, then the ﬁreman has no expectation of being neither sanctioned nor rewarded
(i.e. the probability of these consequences is 0). So, the fWillingness function is calculated as follows:
fWillingness(iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC,ΓDC) = 1× 0+ 0.5× 11+ 0.5 −
1× 0+ 0.25× 1
1+ 0.25 = 0.33− 0.2 = 0.13
6.2. Subjective value function
The degree assigned to the desires generated by the norm compliance bridge rules is deﬁned by the fSubjectiveValue func-
tion, which combines the relevance of the instance and the motivation to comply with this instance as a real value within
the [0,1] interval. Both conditions, the relevance of the instance and the motivation to comply with it, are required for
creating a new desire. Again, we consider that these two conditions are independent and we combine the uncertain values
that cause the translation of the norm into a desire as a product:
fSubjectiveValue(ρNRC,ρWillingness) = ρNRC × ρWillingness
where ρWillingness = fWillingness(〈D,C, self , A, E, S, R〉,ΓBC,ΓDC).
In our example, the fSubjectiveValue is calculated as follows:
fSubjectiveValue(0.32,0.13) = 0.32× 0.01 = 0.04
Thus the obligation compliance bridge rule is instantiated as follows:
NRC : instance(iﬁreAbortion,0.32),0.13> δCompliance
DC : (D abort(gateHouse),0.04)
Assuming δCompliance = 0.05 (in the next section we describe how the most suitable value for this threshold has been esti-
mated in this case-study) then a new desire to abort rescue is inferred inside the DC. Since this desire that can be achieved
through a plan, then the ﬁreman aborts its intention to continue with the rescue and creates a new intention to abort the
rescue. This will cause that the agent executes the plan for abandoning the gateHouse building.
In this section we have proposed several bridge rules and functions that allow agents to reason about norm compliance.
Speciﬁcally, in this section we have described how n-BDI agents consider both their preferences and the norm repercussions
when they determine their willingness to comply with norms. In the next section we describe the experiment that we have
carried out to evaluate the performance of n-BDI agents under uncertainty within dynamic environments.
21 Note that the two summations on the ﬁrst element on the subtraction are calculated over the result of function f F .
22 Note that the two summations on the second element on the subtraction are calculated over the result of function f V .
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7. Evaluation
We have performed an experiment to evaluate to what extent having an explicit declarative procedure for reasoning
about norms under uncertainty helps agents to adapt successfully to dynamic environments. Speciﬁcally, we seek to compare
the results obtained by n-BDI agents with agents that are unaware of norms and with agents that make decisions about
norm compliance using a static method. To this aim, we have developed a simulator of the ﬁre-rescue scenario.
7.1. Fire-rescue scenario modelling
The ﬁre-rescue case study has been modelled as a grid. Thus, victims are randomly located in the grid. The ﬁreman is
initially located at the door of the building. For simplicity we have assumed that the building has one door. Initially there is
one ﬁre that is randomly positioned in the grid. In each iteration a new ﬁre is created on a free position of the grid. Fig. 2
illustrates an example of a rescue grid. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁre-rescue scenario is modelled as a grid of size 4, the door size is
3 and there are 3 victims that have not been rescued yet.
We have performed different simulations for comparing the results that are obtained by three different implementations
of the ﬁreman: (i) non-normative ﬁreman, which does not consider norms; (ii) norm-constrained ﬁreman, which translates
norms into constraints; and (iii) n-BDI ﬁreman, which is implemented using the n-BDI architecture. Next, the different
ﬁreman implementations and the results obtained by these implementations are described in detail.
7.2. Fireman modelling
7.2.1. Non-normative ﬁreman
In this implementation the ﬁreman is not aware of norms. It moves randomly along the grid searching for victims. When
the ﬁreman ﬁnds a victim, it builds a path to the reach the victim. If this path exists, then the ﬁreman tries to reach the
victim. If the ﬁreman is able to reach the victim, then it carries the victim to the door. Once the victim has been rescued,
the ﬁreman moves randomly again to ﬁnd another victim. The ﬁreman follows this pattern until it completes the rescue
(i.e., it rescues all victims that are reachable) or it dies.
7.2.2. Norm-constrained ﬁreman
In this implementation the ﬁreman has knowledge about the nﬁreAbortion norm. However, the ﬁreman uses static and
ﬁxed mechanisms for reasoning about norms. Speciﬁcally, this obligation norm has been translated into a constraint using
a static threshold. In each iteration, the ﬁreman calculates the risk. If the risk is higher than a ﬁxed risk threshold, then
the ﬁreman stops the ﬁre-rescue and it goes to the door. Therefore, norm-constrained ﬁreman is not able to adapt their
norm compliance decisions to different situations since it always follows the same constraint determined by a static risk
threshold. The risk of a given situation is calculated as the percentage of the surrounding positions that are in ﬂames. In
this simulation, we assume that the ﬁreman is able to determine whether the positions that are next to it are in ﬂames or
not.
7.2.3. n-BDI ﬁreman
The n-BDI ﬁreman has explicit knowledge about the nﬁreAbortion norm and it uses expressive and ﬂexible methods for
reasoning about norm compliance.
For simplicity, we assume that the n-BDI ﬁreman has been informed about the salience of the obligation by three experts
and that the salience it assigns to this norm is 0.64 (as described in Section 4.2).
As explained before in Section 5.2, norms become relevant when their activation condition holds and the agent believes
that it is under the inﬂuence of the norm. In this implementation, we assume that the ﬁreman believes that it is playing
ﬁreman role with the highest certainty (i.e., the ﬁreman is working at this moment and according to Table 1 the certainty of
this belief is 1). The risk of a situation is calculated as in case of the norm-constrained ﬁreman. According to the deﬁnition of
the fRelevance function (see Section 5.2), the relevance of the obligation is calculated as a product between the certainty about
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and the norm salience (according to Table 1 the salience of the norm is 0.64). Once the relevance of the obligation norm
has been calculated, then the ﬁreman executes the obligation compliance bridge rule (described in Section 6). According to
this rule, when the value calculated by the willingness function is higher than the norm compliance threshold, then a new
desire is created for achieving the obligatory condition.
According to the deﬁnition of the willingness function (explained in Section 6.1), its value is calculated considering the
fulﬁlment and violation consequences. The predicted consequences of fulﬁlling the iﬁreAbortion instance are deﬁned as follows:
f F (iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC) =
{(
abort(gateHouse),1
)}∪ {(survive(self ),probSurvive)}
where probSurvive stands for the probability of surviving if the ﬁreman aborts the rescue. Similarly, the predicted conse-
quences of violating i are deﬁned as follows:
f V (iﬁreAbortion,ΓBC) =
{(¬abort(gateHouse),1)}∪ {(survive(victims),probSaveVictims)}
where probSaveVictims stands for the probability of saving one more victim. Thus, the indirect consequence of the obligation
fulﬁlment is that the ﬁreman survives to the ﬁre-rescue, whereas the indirect consequence of the obligation violation is that
more victims can be rescued.
We assume that the ﬁreman does not have any desire related to the cancellation of the ﬁre-rescue. Thus, this case study
helps us to illustrate how n-BDI agents are able to make decisions about norm compliance even if norms do not affect
directly the agent goals. In this situation, the willingness function is calculated as follows:
(1 ∗ 0) + (probSurvive ∗ desSurvive)
1+ probSurvive −
(1 ∗ 0) + (probSaveVictims ∗ desSaveVictims)
1+ desSaveVictims
The concrete desirability of these prepositions (desSurvive and desSaveVictims) determines the personality of the ﬁreman.
The probability of saving one more victim is calculated as follows:
• When the ﬁreman is carrying a victim then the probability of saving this victim is 1.
• If it is not the case, the ﬁreman looks its surroundings and searches for victims. The probability of saving these victims is
calculated by considering the Manhattan distance [32] between the positions of the ﬁreman and the victim. Speciﬁcally,
this probability is calculated by a function that returns value that decreases linearly as the distance increases.
Similarly, the probability of saving the ﬁreman life is calculated considering the Manhattan distance [32] between the
positions of the ﬁreman and the door.
7.3. Experiment
The main goal of the experiments that we have performed is to determine whether the use of the n-BDI architecture
to implement the ﬁreman agent improves its performance in a wide-range of situations. With this aim we performed
simulations in which the different parameters of the grids (i.e., their size, the number of victims and the size of the door)
are changed. Next, we compare the results obtained by the three implementations.
7.3.1. Experiment metrics
There are two main factors that determine the success of a ﬁre-rescue: the percentage of victims that are rescued and
the survival of the ﬁreman.
A simulation is represented as a set (G, D, V , R, F ), where: G is the size of the grid; D is the door size; V is the total
number of victims; R is the number of victims that have been rescued; and F takes value 1 when the ﬁreman survives to
the ﬁre-rescue operation, otherwise it takes value 0.
The victim survival percentage achieved in a single simulation (G, D, V , R, F ) is deﬁned as:
R
fMaxRescuedVictims(G, D, V )
where fMaxRescuedVictims is a function such that for each grid size, door size and number of victims returns the maximum
number of victims that can be rescued on average.23 Given a set of simulations (N = {(G1, D1, V1, R1, Fi), . . . , (GN , DN , VN ,
RN , Fn)}) the victim survival percentage (SV ) is deﬁned as:
SV (N ) =
∑N
i=1
Ri
fMaxRescuedVictims(Gi ,Di ,Vi)
N
× 100
23 To estimate the values returned by this function we have performed a set of simulations of the non-normative ﬁreman.
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Fig. 4. Success obtained by n-BDI ﬁreman with respect to the compliance threshold. The X-axis represents the compliance threshold and the Y -axis
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The ﬁreman survival percentage achieved in a set of simulations N = {(G1, D1, V1, R1, Fi), . . . , (GN , DN , VN , RN , FN)} is
deﬁned as:
S F (N ) =
∑N
i=1 Fi
N
× 100
We deﬁne the success (S) of a set of simulations as a product between the values calculated by SV and S F for this
simulation set.
Threshold estimation. To determine which are the most suitable values for the risk threshold and the compliance threshold,
we have performed a set of simulations varying the value of these thresholds. In each simulation, a ﬁreman (norm-
constrained or n-BDI) is allocated in a grid. The size of these grids (G) ranges randomly within the [3,10] interval. The
size of the door (D) ranges randomly within the [1,G] interval. The number of victims (V ) ranges within the [1, (G−1)22 ]
interval. For each value of the thresholds we have performed 1000 simulations. Fig. 3 shows the success (S) obtained by
norm-constrained ﬁreman with respect to the value of the risk threshold. As illustrated by this ﬁgure, the best result is
obtained when the risk threshold is set to 0.31. Fig. 4 shows the success (S) obtained by n-BDI ﬁreman24 with respect to
the value of the compliance threshold. As illustrated by this ﬁgure, the best result is obtained by n-BDI ﬁreman when the
compliance threshold is set to 0.08. Therefore, in the rest of experiments we have ﬁxed the thresholds to these two values.
7.3.2. Experiment description
We have performed different simulations for comparing the results obtained by the three types of ﬁreman. In the n-BDI
architecture, the speciﬁc values given to the desSurvive and desSaveVictims parameters determine the personality of the
ﬁreman. In this experiment, we consider three different personalities:
• Empathetic ﬁreman, which wants to preserve victims’ life as much as it wants to preserve its own life. Therefore, both
desSurvive and desSaveVictims have been set to 1.0.
24 Note that in this experiment both desSurvive and desSaveVictims have been set to 1.
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95% conﬁdence interval for the victim survival percentage (SV ), the ﬁreman survival percentage (S F ) and the success (S) that each imple-
mentation achieves.
Fireman implementation SV (%) S F (%) S (%)
Non-normative 99.96± 0.04 22.49± 0.64 22.48± 0.64
Norm-constrained 80.95± 1.26 79.16± 0.89 63.14± 1.14
Empathetic n-BDI 87.83± 0.43 76.8± 0.86 66.76± 0.62
Coward n-BDI 84.22± 0.56 79.8± 0.87 66.17± 0.57
Brave n-BDI 99.87± 0.05 36.46± 0.76 36.41± 0.76
• Coward ﬁreman, which wants to preserve victims’ life less than it wants to preserve its own life. Therefore, desSurvive =
1 and desSaveVictims= 0.5.
• Brave ﬁreman, which wants to preserve victims’ life more than it wants to preserve its own life. Therefore, desSurvive =
0.5 and desSaveVictims= 1.0.
Therefore, we have experimented with 5 types of ﬁreman; non-normative ﬁreman, norm-constrained ﬁreman, empathetic
ﬁreman, coward ﬁreman and brave ﬁreman.
In each simulation the size of the grid (G) ranges within the [3,10] interval, the size of the door (D) ranges within the
[1,G] interval and the number of victims (V ) ranges within the [1, (G−1)22 ] interval. For each value of G , D and V we have
performed 1000 different simulations to support the ﬁndings.
7.3.3. Experiment results
Table 2 shows the results obtained by the simulations.
As one could expect, the non-normative ﬁreman is able to rescue almost all the victims that can be rescued, since the
ﬁreman does not abort the ﬁre-rescue ever. However, the ﬁreman survival is very low. Therefore, the lowest success is
obtained by the non-normative ﬁreman.
In case of the norm-constrained ﬁreman, it achieves better results since the ﬁreman survival percentage is signiﬁcantly
higher than the non-normative ﬁreman, whereas the victim survival percentage decreases in a lesser degree. The conﬁdence
intervals in case of the norm-constrained ﬁreman are the largest. Hence, the behaviour exhibited by the norm-constrained
ﬁreman is more variable: i.e., the results obtained change from rescue to rescue which implies that the norm-constrained
ﬁreman has some diﬃculties to adapt to different rescue operations.
The empathetic n-BDI ﬁreman is more altruistic than norm-constrained ﬁreman and the victim survival percentage (SV )
increases. Moreover, its survival is lightly lower. As a consequence, a higher success is obtained by empathetic ﬁreman.
The coward n-BDI ﬁreman wants to preserve victims’ life less than it wants to preserve its own life. As a consequence, the
ﬁreman survival percentage (S F ) increases. Since the coward ﬁreman takes less risks, then the number of rescued victims
decreases lightly. As a consequence, the success that is obtained by the coward ﬁreman is similar to the empathetic ﬁreman.
Moreover, we can observe that the coward ﬁreman obtains a ﬁreman survival percentage similar to the norm-constrained
ﬁreman, while it obtains better results in terms of victim survival. Thus, the n-BDI architecture can be used to model an
improved version of the norm-constrained ﬁreman.
Finally, the brave n-BDI ﬁreman wants to preserve victims’ life more than it wants to preserve its own life. As a conse-
quence, the victim survival percentage (SV ) increases. However, the brave ﬁreman takes more risks and its survival decreases
notably. As a consequence, the success obtained by the brave ﬁreman is lower than the other n-BDI ﬁreman. Nonetheless,
we can observe that the brave ﬁreman is able to rescue a percentage of victims similar to the non-normative, while it
obtains better results in terms of ﬁreman survival. Thus, the n-BDI architecture can be used to model an improved version
of the non-normative ﬁreman.
In general, empathetic and coward n-BDI ﬁremen achieve a small improvement with respect to the norm-constrained
ﬁreman (e.g., success in empathetic ﬁreman improves a 5.73%). This small improvement is due to the fact that only one
ﬁreman participates in the ﬁre-rescue operation. If more ﬁremen participated, more victims would be rescued and the
difference between the results achieved by n-BDI ﬁremen and norm-constrained ﬁremen would also increase.25
As the experimental results illustrate, the use of the n-BDI architecture allows a more dynamic behaviour to be modelled.
Speciﬁcally, we have demonstrated that due to the expressive and ﬂexible rules used to reason about norms n-BDI agents
achieve a better adaptation to dynamic environments by making more reasoned decisions about when a norm should be
complied or violated. n-BDI agents are capable of self-adjusting their behaviour to the features of the ﬁre-rescue operation
in which they are involved. Moreover, different agent personalities can be modelled. Thereby, the behaviour of agents is
predictable to some degree and MAS designers can decide the behaviour of the agents according to the functionality that is
required.
25 The use of several ﬁremen leads us to the problem of coordinating teams of ﬁremen which is out of the scope of this paper. For this reason, we have
carried experiments in which only one ﬁreman participates.
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The ﬁrst proposal that deﬁned a norm-autonomous agent as an agent whose behaviour is inﬂuenced by norms that are
explicitly represented inside its mind was made by Conte et al. in [17]. Conte et al. also stated that norm-autonomous agents
have capabilities for acquiring norms, accepting a recognised norm, determining whether a norm concerns their case, and
making decisions about norm compliance. From that moment on, several proposals on norm-autonomous agents have been
made. For example, Castelfranchi et al. in [14] described how an agent architecture can be extended with an explicit norm
notion. Similarly, Dignum et al. proposed in [21] an extension of the classic BDI architecture for considering norms. These
ﬁrst proposals provide intuitive ideas and recommendations to meet the main requirements to norm-autonomous agents.
However, the authors did not specify a solution to meet these requirements. The work of Boella and Lesmo in [8], was one of
the ﬁrst proposals on the MAS ﬁeld that provided a solution to the autonomous decision on norm compliance. Speciﬁcally,
the authors provided some strategies for making a decision about norm compliance. However, they did not provide enough
details about how agent programmers can develop norm-autonomous agents that implement these strategies.
More recent works have also confronted with the problem of how agents reason about norms. Speciﬁcally, this problem
has been faced from a logical and formal perspective, e.g., the proposals contained in [27,34] describe logic formalisms and
axioms for representing norms. Besides that, there are proposals on the development of agent architectures that provide
means to software agents to take norms into account in their practical reasoning; i.e., proposals on the development of
algorithms and procedures for allowing agents to decide the next action to be executed according to norms. Given that
our proposal falls into this last category, this section reviews the most relevant architectures for norm-autonomous agents.
These architectures have been classiﬁed into norm-oriented or goal-oriented according to the priority that agents give to
norms with respect to their internal goals.
8.1. Norm-oriented agents
The main purpose of norm-oriented agents is to always observe norms, even if this implies that they are unable to
achieve their internal goals. An example of norm-oriented agent architecture is the noA architecture [31], which is a practical
agent architecture with an explicit notion of obligation and prohibition. noA agents are not endowed with capabilities for
acquiring norms and, as a consequence, the norms that the agent take into account are a priori deﬁned. Basically, noA
agents determine which norms are relevant to the agent at a given moment. As in our proposal, norms have activation
and expiration conditions deﬁne when norms become relevant. However, the noA proposal assumes that agents are able to
perceive and act upon a certain environment. Another example of norm-oriented agent are Normative KGP agents, which
are described in [42]. This proposal consists of extending KGP (Knowledge-Goal-Plan) agents [30] with explicit normative
notions such as obligations, prohibitions, and roles. Thus, norms deﬁne which are the responsibilities of a speciﬁc set of
agents which are playing a given role. As in our proposal, KGP agents consider as relevant all norms that affect the roles
being played by them.
As previously mentioned norm-oriented agents always try to fulﬁl norms. Thus, they assume that the best course of
action in any case is to follow norms. This assumption may be valid for static environments. In dynamic environments
the circumstances may change drastically making norms to loose their validity. Therefore, agents situated in this type of
scenarios require more elaborated processes for reasoning about norms (i.e., acquiring norms, accepting norms and making
decisions about norm compliance).
8.2. Goal-oriented agents
In contrast, goal-oriented normative agents always seek to achieve their desires, fulﬁlling norms whenever possible.
BOID. In [10], Broersen et al. propose the extension of the BDI architecture with an explicit notion of obligation. This is
one of the ﬁrst proposals on norm-autonomous agents that describes how these agents (known as BOID) can be designed
in practise. Thus, BOID agents are formed by four components that are associated with Beliefs, Obligations, Intentions and
Desires. Obligations are the external motivations of agents and their validity is taken for granted. In this proposal, agents
can violate norms only due to a conﬂict among obligations, desires or intentions. This type of conﬂicts is solved by means of
a static ordering function that resolves conﬂicts between components and within components. In contrast to our proposal,
BOID agents always follow a rigid protocol for making decisions about norm compliance; i.e., they cannot decide to follow
or not a given norm according to their circumstances.
López y López’s proposal. One of the ﬁrst proposals on goal-oriented agents that have explicitly considered the current
circumstances of agents for making decisions regarding norms is made by López y López’s et al. in [33]. Speciﬁcally, this
work proposes methods for agents that are autonomous to come to decisions about norms. The main drawbacks of this
proposal are: (i) norm compliance is only based on the existence of an external mechanism of norm enforcement and, as
a consequence, in absence of information about the enforcement mechanisms agents have no motivation to comply with
norms; and (ii) it assumes that agents are situated in a certain and deterministic environment, therefore agents make
decisions about norms upon certain and perfect knowledge about the environment. In practise, agents interact by means of
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unsuitable to be applied in real applications. In response to this problem we have developed the n-BDI architecture.
EMIL. In all of the aforementioned proposals, either norms are hard-coded on agents off-line or agents are informed
by authorities about norms on-line. Therefore, agents are not capable of learning new norms on-line and adapting their
behaviours according to these unforeseen norms. To address this, the EMIL proposal [3] developed a framework for au-
tonomous norm recognition. Thus, agents would be able to acquire new norms by observing the behaviour of other agents
that are located in their environments. EMIL agents make decisions about norm by means of static utility functions that
calculate the expected outcomes of compiling with norms. This solution is suitable for controlled environments in which
agents confront with foreseeable situations. However, the kind of scenarios addressed in this paper, which are dynamic en-
vironments characterised by uncertainty, require more ﬂexible solutions to the norm compliance dilemma. As stated in [14]
“if protocols that agents use to react to the environment are ﬁxed, they have no ways to respond to unpredictable changes”.
Although several proposals have been made to deﬁne norm-autonomous agents [13], the deﬁnition of an agent archi-
tecture for norm-autonomous agents that have a physical presence in a real word environment remains unsolved. All these
proposals assume that agents are situated in a certain and deterministic environment. Thus, these proposals deﬁne static
procedures for reasoning about norms such as blind obedience to norms, static utility functions, or static priority orders. For
example, the BOID architecture [10] deﬁnes a static priority order among mental attitudes that is programmed on agents.
These static mechanisms entail a limitation on the agent capacities for adapting to new societies or to the environmental
changes. Only the proposal of López y López et al., deﬁned mechanisms for allowing agents to reason about norms ac-
cording to current circumstances of the agent. However, López y López assumed that agents are situated within a certain
environment that can be perceived by agents with complete precision. The added value of our proposal with respect to
the existing literature is that our agents have been designed to achieve a better adaptation to dynamic environments under
uncertainty. To this aim n-BDI agents are able to represent the uncertainty of the environment explicitly, which implies
that the norm reasoning process is more ﬁne-grained. We deﬁned n-BDI agents using declarative procedures for norm rea-
soning and empirically proved that they perform better than more static approaches when dealing with uncertainty within
dynamic environments.
9. Conclusions
Uncertainty is one of the most important problems when agents have a physical presence in some real-world environ-
ment. However, uncertainty has received little attention in the existing literature on norm-autonomous agents. To address
this problem, we propose the n-BDI architecture in this paper. n-BDI agents are able to represent the uncertainty about
the environment. Moreover, we have endowed them with declarative procedures that allow them to represent the norms
that are in force in their environment, to accept them, to detect which ones are relevant at a given moment and to make
a decision about norm compliance. The main goal of the n-BDI architecture is to model agents that are able to reason
about norms while being able to adapt to dynamic environments under uncertainty. To evaluate the n-BDI architecture,
we have implemented a simulator of a ﬁre-rescue case study. Speciﬁcally, we have modelled the behaviour of the ﬁreman
that participates in a ﬁre-rescue following three different approaches: ignoring norms, implementing norms using static
procedures and using the n-BDI architecture to implement ﬁremen agents. As the experimental results illustrate, the fact
that agents have more expressive procedures for reasoning about norms allows them to better adapt under uncertainty to a
dynamic environment. Speciﬁcally, we have demonstrated that n-BDI agents are capable of self-adjusting their behaviour to
the features of the ﬁre-rescue operation in which they are involved.
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